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the same result as the court of the state in which it is sitting. It
was also pointed out that there is no important counter-considera-
tion because the state burden of proof rule can be easily ascer-
tained and applied by the federal court.
That the burden of proof is often the decisive factor in tort
cases cannot be disputed. It follows, therefore, that when a court
refuses to apply the foreign burden of proof rule, the plaintiff's
chances of recovering in the same manner and to the same extent
as if the action had been brought at the place of wrong are either
enlarged or diminished. Uniformity of result is certainly not ac-
complished. If we admit the validity of the basic choice of law
policy, it must be agreed that the court of the forum should clas-
sify as procedural only those foreign laws which would seriously
inconvenience the court and hamper the effective administration
of justice. The court should not be influenced by a classification
made in a purely domestic case; its classification should be con-
trolled by choice of law policy. Is there any strong countervailing
argument to justify the court of the forum to classify a burden
of proof rule as procedural? Such cases as Sampson v. Channel
and Precourt v. Driscoll furnish the answer. Certainly it cannot
be said that ascertaining and applying a foreign burden of proof
rule is so onerous a duty as to justify a court to place the ideal of
uniformity in jeopardy. The proper rule, then, is that the court
of the forum should apply the foreign rule regulating the burden
of proving contributory negligence.
The Louisiana cases3 9 recognize the general distinction be-
tween substantive and procedural matters, but no cases have been
found which discuss the precise problems treated herein. Un-
bound by precedents, the way is open for the courts of Louisiana
to give full effect to the basic choice of law policies.
LELAND H. COLTHARP, JR.*
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
When there is a conflict between the statute of limitations of
the forum and that of a foreign jurisdiction, the law of which
applies generally to the legal relation in question (lex causae),
which statute should be applied? The general rule in Anglo-
American common law, contrary to that prevailing on the conti-
39. Wasson v. Gatling, 184 So. 596 (La. App. 1938); Matney v. Blue Rib-
bon, Inc., 12 So.(2d) 249 (1942), affirmed 202 La. 505, 12 So.(2d) 253 (1942).
* Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, DeRidder Bar.
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nent,1 is that statutes of limitation are procedural law and, there-
fore, the law of the forum applies.2
This rule seems to have been developed chiefly for con-
venience. A court, desiring to keep its dockets clear, is likely to
give preference to causes that are not barred under the law creat-
ing that court. If a cause were barred under the statute of limita-
tions of the forum, even though not barred in the "jurisdiction of
origin," the courts did not wish to congest their dockets, particu-
larly since stale claims are more difficult of proof. In order to
justify this action it was found necessary to create a rule of law;
hence the rule that statutes of limitation are procedural. In this
way the courts were able to apply the statute of limitations of
the forum rather than that of the lex causae. The result of a
general application of this rule was this: If a cause of action was
not barred where it arose but was barred at the forum, there was
no recovery; 3 if a cause of action was barred where it arose but
not barred at the forum, there was recovery.
4
Louisiana agrees with the majority view that statutes of
limitation are procedural and that the statute of the forum pre-
vails. Since 1825, Article 13 of the Code of Practice has provided
that, "The forms, the effects, and the prescription of actions, are
governed by the law of the place where they are brought. .. ."
In the Louisiana cases on the subject, the court, with or without
reference to Article 13, accepts and applies the general American
rule which classifies statutes of limitation as procedural.5
1. Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualification and the Conflict of Laws (1920)
20 Col. L. Rev. 247, 256.
2. Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws (1933) 31 Mich.
L. Rev. 474, 486; Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualification and the Conflict of
Laws (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 247, 256; Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of
Laws (1937) 141; Note (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 1078; Restatement, Conflict of
Laws (1934) § 604.
3. British Linen Co. v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 903 (K.B. 1830); McEl-
moyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839).
4. Huber v. Steiner, 2 Bing. N.C. 202, 132 Eng. Reprint 80 (C.P. 1835).
5. "The laws of the place of contract, in relation to limitations or pre-
scription must be left out of view. The doctrine appears to be fully estab-
lished that the lex fori alone governs in respect to such matters." Union Cot-
ton Manufactory v. Lobdell, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 108 (La. 1828).
"The law of the forum governs the question of prescription .... Erwin
v. Lowery, 2 La. Ann. 314, 315 (1847).
"It is unnecessary to inquire what would be the effects of such an ac-
knowledgment, under the statute of limitations in Mississippi. Questions of
prescription affect the remedy and must be determined by the law of the
forum." Newman v. Goza, 2 La. Ann. 642, 646 (1847).
"... the general rule being that the law of the forum governs prescrip-
tion of actions." Brown v. Stone, 4 La. Ann. 235, 236 (1849).
". . . we think it settled by the highest authority, that the prescription
of the forum or place where the remedy is sought, must govern in all suits
for the recovery of debts." Bacon v. Dahlgreen, 7 La. Ann. 599, 605 (1852).
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According to the view of most American courts, not only is
the period of the statute of limitations of the lex fori applied,
but the law of the forum is applied also to the incidents connected
with the statute of limitations, such as interruptions and the
effect of acknowledgments." The law of the forum has been used
even to determine if the instrument is a "specialty" within the
terms of the forum statute of limitations. 7
In all of the reported cases on the question, Louisiana ap-
parently agrees with this majority view that the law of the
forum is to be applied to all incidents of any problem concerning
the limitation of actions. In Lacaste v. Benton,8 a suit on an
instrument executed in Mississippi and negotiable by the law of
Mississippi but not by the law of Louisiana, it was decided that
the Louisiana prescription of five years applicable to negotiable
paper did not apply but that the Louisiana prescription of per-
sonal actions (ten years) did apply. The court said that the
forum, in deciding which of its prescriptive laws to apply, must
use its own laws in determining the character of the foreign con-
tract.
In Young v. Crossgrove,9 the Louisiana prescription of ten
years was again applied to a Mississippi negotiable instrument,
because the instrument was not negotiable under the law of
Louisiana. In Bacon v. Dahlgreen,10 the Crossgrove case was cited
with approval, but it was held that the Mississippi instrument
was negotiable under Louisiana law.
As stated above, the rule that statutes of limitation are pro-
cedural resulted in the enforcement of claims barred in the
foreign state but not in the forum. The enforcement of these
claims was certainly not the purpose for which the rule was
developed, and the Anglo-American courts recognized the
inequity of enforcing claims barred by the law reasonably
anticipated by the parties. Hence, exceptions to the rule were
developed to take care of some of the claims for which the foreign
. ..article 13 of the Code of Practice lays down the rule that a plea of
prescription of an action is governed by the law of the place where the
action is brought." Meridian Fertilizer Factory v. Collier, 193 La. 815, 819,
192 So. 358, 359 (1939).
The same view is expressed in the Louisiana federal cases. Tinsley v.
Mills, 36 F. Supp. 621 (D.C. La. 1940).
6. Dunn Const. Co. v. Bourne, 172 Miss. 620, 628, 159 So. 841, 843 (1935).
7. Ailes, supra note 2, at 490.
8. 3 La. Ann. 220 (1848).
9. 4 La. Ann. 233 (1849).
10. 7 La. Ann, 599 (1852).
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state had a shorter prescriptive period than did the forum. How-
ever, the courts did not simply announce that, if the foreign
statute provided a longer period of limitation than did the forum,
the statute of the forum would be applied, and that if the foreign
period was shorter, the foreign statute would be applied to bar
the action. On the contrary, the courts, while maintaining their
general rule, proceeded by establishing a distinction between
(1) foreign "statutes of limitation" which were said to be pro-
cedural and therefore not applicable by the forum, and (2) foreign
prescriptions which not only barred the action but "extinguished"
the substantive right. The latter class was excepted from the
application of the law of the forum.1' Louisiana recognizes this
exception, 12 although in only one Louisiana case was it decided
that a foreign time limit was substantive.' 3
There are two kinds of time limitations to be considered in
determining whether a foreign prescription falls within this
"substantive" exception: 1 (1) special statutes which limit the
time in which a particular action can be brought and (2) general
statutes limiting the time in which certain major classes of
actions can be brought.
It is generally held that when a statute creates a substantive
right not known at common law, and simultaneously provides
that suit must be commenced within a specified time, that the
time limitation is an integral part of the right and, once the
statute has run, the right is "extinguished."' 5 Wrongful death
statutes have been treated as examples of this type of special
statute. Of such a statute, Chief Justice Waite said, in the case
of The Harrisburg: "The time within which the suit must be
brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created,
and not of the remedy alone."' 6 Other examples are actions to
enforce the statutory liability of stockholders 7 and actions under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act.' 8
11. 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) § 604(3).
12. Harrison v. Stacy, 6 Rob. 15 (La. 1843); Succession of Ducker, 10 La.
Ann. 758 (1855).
13. Harrison v. Stacy, 6 Rob. 15 (La. 1843).
14. The well-settled rule that title conferred on an adverse possessor by
the loss of the former owner's right to sue for the recovery of property due
to the running of a foreign statute of limitations will be recognized by the
courts of other jurisdictions will not be discussed herein.
15. Ailes, supra note 2, at 495; 3 Beale, op. cit. supra note 11, at § 605.1.
16. 199 U.S. 199, 214, 7 S.Ct. 140, 147 (1886).
17. Terminal Co. v. National Bank of Baltimore, 99 Fed. 635 (C.C.A. 4th
1900).
18. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 39 S.Ct. 75 (1915).
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In Davis v. Mills," ' the United States Supreme Court held
that, although the new right of action was created in one statute
and the statutory limitation provided in a subsequent statute,
the right itself was modified, since the separate statute was
"directed to the newly created right so specifically as to warrant
saying that it qualified the right. ' 20
The Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act was thus
treated by the Supreme Court of Mississippi as a special statute
creating a new liability and limiting the period of remedy in
such a way as to make it substantive law and applicable in
Mississippi. 21
Although there are no reported cases in Louisiana in which
a foreign special statute of limitation is discussed, it seems prob-
able that, if such a case were to arise, we would adopt the view
of our sister states and of the United States Supreme Court.
. How does a court decide if a general statute of limitations
"destroys the right" in such a way as to make it substantive
law?
Whenever possible, the forum will use the law of the foreign
state-whether statutory or case law-to determine the nature of
the statute.
The forum will first look to the decisions of the courts of
.the state of the foreign statute to see if the statute has been
treated as substantive or procedural in non-conflict of laws situa-
tions.
In Baker v. Stonebroker,22 The Missouri Supreme Court held
that a Maryland statute providing that no bill, bond or judgment
should be "good, pleadable or admitted in evidence" after twelve
years had "extinguished" the right and thus barred the suit.
To reach this decision the Missouri court used a Maryland case
which had held that the running of the statute destroyed the
claim to the extent that a subsequent acknowledgment could not
revive a right of action.
In Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Company,23 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in seeking to determine if an Illinois statute of
limitations was substantive or procedural, admitted that Illinois
decisions had held that only the remedy was destroyed, in the
19. 194 U.S. 451, 24 S.Ct. 692, 48 L.Ed. 1067 (1904).
20. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454, 24 S.Ct. 692, 694, 48 L.Ed. 1067, 1070
(1904).
21. Dunn Const. Co. v. Bourne, 172 Miss 620, 159 So. 841 (1935).
22. 36 Mo. 338 (1865).
23. 103 Wis. 373, 79 N.W. 433 (1899).
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sense that the obligor could revive the obligation, but then cited
other decisions in which the completion of the period had been
held by the Illinois courts to create a "vested right" of property
in the obligor, which right could not be taken away by subse-
quent legislative action without constitutional violation. The
Wisconsin court said: ". . . while the test of whether the statute
of limitations of Illinois, when fully run upon a claim, bars the
right to such claim in the courts of this state, is whether it
extinguishes such right in Illinois, the test of whether such
is its effect in such state is whether the right to the benefit of
the statutory bar is there considered a constitutional privilege
that cannot be taken from its possessor adversely. ' 24
Since the Illinois view of the barred cause of action as consti-
tutionally protected property of the obligor agreed with that of
the Wisconsin court in the interpretation of its own statute of
limitations (although this view is not held by the United States
Supreme Court) ,25 the Wisconsin court seemed relieved that it
could seize on it as a test and ignore the fact that the obligation
was subject to revival.
The Mississippi case of Dunn Construction Company v.
Bourne26 serves not only as an illustration of the usual treatment
of a special statute of limitations, but also as an illustration of the
persuasive effect which a decision of the foreign court may have
on the forum's classification of a foreign statute of limitations.:"
Suit was brought under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. The defendant employer pleaded twelve months' pre-
scription under the Louisiana act. The plaintiff rebutted by plead-
ing that he had sued the defendant's insurer within the twelve
months, that the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act makes
employer and insurer solidarily liable, and that Article 2097 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provides that a suit against one
debtor in solido interrupts prescription with regard to all.
The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the period of limi-
,tation of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act had been
held by the Louisiana Supreme Court to be substantive law (in
24. Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 103 Wis. 373, 379, 79 N.W. 433, 435
(1899).
25. "We are unable to see how a man can be said to have a property
right in the bar of the statute as a defense to his promise to pay. In the
most liberal extension of the word 'property' it is new to call the defense of
lapse of time, to the obligation to pay money, property." Campbell v. Holt,
115 U.S. 620, 629, 6 S.Ct. 209, 214, 29 L.Ed. 483 (1885).
26. 172 Miss. 620, 159 So. 841 (1935).
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White v. Louisiana Western Railroad Company,27 a non-conflict
of laws case in which it was decided that a cause of action arising
before a change in the period of limitation could not be affected
by the change). The court then said, "We are therefore of the
opinion that we are justified in construing this period of limita-
tion to be a part of the substantive law of the state of Louisiana,
which is binding upon us, not being contrary to our own public
policy .... *"28
Although it willingly applied the prescription of the Louisi-
ana Workmen's Compensation Act, the Mississippi court refused
to use Article 2097 of the Civil Code of 1870 to determine that
suit against the insurer interrupted prescription as to the em-
ployer. The court held, "The general statute of limitations and
interceptions thereto, or interruptions thereof, are part of the
procedure of Louisiana and not part of its substantive law ...
they cannot be applied by us. .... ,29
If the foreign state has other statutes regulating the effect
of the statute of limitations, the court of the forum will look to
them in much the same fashion as it would look to the jurispru-
dence of the' foreign state to determine the effect of the statute.
Wood and Selick v. Compagnie General Transatlantique8 0
was a federal circuit court case in which suit was brought for
negligence in the carriage of goods at sea. The contracts em-
bodied in the bills of lading stipulated that French law should
govern. The question was whether the prescription of one year
of the French Commercial Code should apply or whether the
provision was merely procedural and did not apply in an Ameri-
can court. To decide whether the prescription destroyed the right
or merely barred the remedy, the court looked to the French
Civil Code. They concluded that, by the provisions of the French
Civil Code, the defense of prescription must be pleaded by the
defendant, and not only was a promise to perform, after the
statutory period had run, binding without new consideration, but
that the obligor could "renounce" prescription in various ways,
and that all these provisions tended to show that the substantive
right was never destroyed and that the French prescriptive
period was procedural law. Since foreign procedural law is not
applicable in the United States, the action was held maintainable.
27. 174 La. 303, 140 So. 486 (1932).
28. Dunn Const. Co. v. Bourne, 172 Miss. 620, 628, 159 So. 841, 843 (1935).
29. 172 Miss. 620, 628, 159 So. 841, 843.
30. 43 F.(2d) 941 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930).
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In McMerty v. Morrison,8 1 the Missouri court approached the
Louisiana law of prescription in much the same way as the United
States circuit court approached the French law in the Wood and
Selick case. The action-one on a promissory note-was not
barred in the forum, but the Louisiana prescription of five years
was pleaded. The question was "whether the civil code prevail-
ing in Louisiana, where it prescribes the time for bringing actions,
is to be regarded as a mere statute of limitations, or whether it
operates as a complete extinguishment of the debt. '32 After an
examination of the Civil Code, it was decided that since prescrip-
tion might be waived by an express or tacit renunciation, or by a
new promise or acknowledgment, there was no extinguishment
of the debt and hence the Louisiana prescriptive period did not
apply in Missouri.
In Smith v. Webb,33 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, in an
action on a tort committed in Louisiana and barred by the Louisi-
ana prescription of one year, but not by the statute of the forum,
applied the statute of the forum because the general Louisiana
codal provisions indicated that the Louisiana prescription was
procedural.
The law of the foreign state, whether embodied in decisions
or codified, has been regarded by most courts as a satisfactory
basis for classifying foreign statutes of limitation as substantive
or procedural. Robertson has endorsed this idea, saying "The
judge of the forum will not sit as a court of appeal on the foreign
law. If the foreign law considers its rule to be either substantive
or procedural, he will not decide that it has no business to do
SO.. . 34
so. . ..
However, some commentators have questioned the validity
of this basis for classification.
Lorenzen writes, "According to the proponents of the second-
ary classification theory, if the law of the forum says that the
statute of limitations (that is, of the forum) is substantive and
the law governing the contract says it (i.e., the statute of the
locus) is procedural, the action would be maintainable even
though it is not brought within the time prescribed by either law.
The statute of limitations of the forum would be applicable only
to contracts governed by the law of the forum and the foreign
31. 62 Mo. 140 (1876).
32. 62 Mo. 140, 143.
33. 181 S.W. 814 (Tex. App. 1916).
34. Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940) 246-247.
1950]
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statute of limitations, being procedural, would be disregarded as
the courts do not enforce the procedural laws of another coun-
try.,"85
In a German Supreme Court case 6 this unfortunate result-
was actually reached. The action was upon a Tennessee contract.
The Tennessee statute of limitations was held to be procedural,
according to American law, and the German statute was held to
be substantive. Thus no statute of limitation was held to apply
and the action was allowed, although the period of both statutes
had expired.
It does not seem, however, that such an anomaly is likely
to arise in any American forum for the reason that, in addition
to a special statute that might be "substantive," every state is
likely to have a general procedural limitation which would
eventually prescribe any contract action.
Certainly, when a forum does not follow the general rule
and recognize that the characterization by a foreign state of its
own statute is binding, then the forum is not using the substan-
tive law of the foreign state, because classification by a state of
its own statutes is substantive law.
When the forum has no jurisprudence or other statutory law
of the foreign state to guide it, the forum must interpret the
statute according to its language. Such interpretations have been
far from consistent.37 But if there is an applicable decision or
statute of the foreign state, the forum, in most cases, will choose
to disregard the language of the statute. Even though the foreign
statute uses language which indicates that it is "substantive" or
that it is "procedural," the court of the forum usually feels com-
pelled to follow a decision or statute of the foreign court which
embodies a contrary conclusion.
The Cases of Baker v. Stonebroker,38 Wood and Selick v.
Cdmpagnie General Transatlantique,5 9 and McMerty v. Morti -
son 4°0 illustrate the insistence of the forum on following the classi-
fication of the foreign state. In each of -these cases the strict
language Of the statute indicated that it was.,"substantive." But
35. Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification or Characterization Prob-
lem in the Conflict of Laws (1941) 50 Yale L.J. 743, 759.
36. German Supreme Court (January 4, 1882) 7 R.G.Z. 221.
37. "The conclusion is irresistible that statutes are often labelled 'sub-
stantive' or 'procedural' depending upon the result sought." Ailes, supra
note 2, at 493.
38. 36 Mo. 338 (1865).
39. 43 F.(2d) 941 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930).
40. 62 Mo. 140 (1876).
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in- each of them, the statute was held to be procedural on the
basis of a statute or decision of the foreign state.
Does Louisiana follow the method of the majority of Ameri-
can,,states in classifying general statutes of limitation, that is, by
relying on the law of the foreign state and only construing the.
language of the statute when there is no relevant statute or deci-
sion of the foreign state? Though there are but few Louisiana
cases in which the problem is even raised, it may safely be said
that Louisiana does use this popular method of classification.
In Taylor and Haddon v. Joor 4' and Succession of Ducker42
a Mississippi statute was pleaded which provided that judgments
should not be revived by scire facias, nor any action brought on
them, after the expiration of seven years. On the face of the
statute, the prescription was held to be inapplicable in Louisiana.
In the Joor case there was no contention that the statute was
substantive. In the Ducker case the question was raised but not
supported by any law of Mississippi, hence dismissed with little
discussion.
In Harrison v. Stacy 43 a Mississippi statute was pleaded
which provided that a claim against a decedent's estate should
be forever barred and the estate discharged therefrom unless it
were presented within the required time. In accordance with the
opinion generally held by the American courts with regard to
such "statutes of non-claim," the Louisiana Supreme Court held
this statute to be substantive.
In Succession of Ducker44 the same Mississippi statute as was
raised in the Stacy case was pleaded, and the court decided that it
was procedural solely because there had been a ruling by the
Mississippi court subsequent to the Stacy case that it merely
"barred the remedy.
45
In both the Stacy and Ducker cases the court accepted the
idea that a foreign "substantive" statute of limitations might bar,
the action without making any attempt to reconcile this conclu-
sion with the language of Article 13 of the Code of Practice which
41. 7 La. Ann. 272 (1852).,
42. 10 La. Ann. 758 (1855).
43. 6 Rob.'15 (La. 1843).
44. 10 La. Ann. 758 (1855).
45. The Mississippi statute pleaded in the Stacy and Ducker cases was
not a statute of limitation but a "statute of non-claim," an entirely different
type of statute. See Rheinstein, Cases on Decedents' Estates (1947) 1076-.'
1079. However, because the Louisiana Supreme Court treated the statute as
an ordinary statute of limitation, the Stacy and Ducker cases are !support
for the proposition that Louisiana will give preference to a foreign state's
characterization.
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plainly states that the prescription of actions is governed by the
law of the place where they are brought.
Since Louisiana is apparently willing to apply the case law
of the foreign state in the classification of its statute of limitations
-even when such an application is almost an absurdity in view
of the language and the purpose of the statute-it seems clear
that there should be an equal willingness to apply the statutes
of the foreign state in classification.
These cases were, of course, decided before Louisiana had
enacted legislation "borrowing" the bar of other states, but in
cases where such legislation does not apply it seems probable
that Louisiana will continue to follow the majority method of
classification.
Judge Story adopted and lent weight to a qualification of the
idea that a foreign statute of limitations may extinguish substan-
tive rights, namely, that both parties must have been present
in the jurisdiction throughout the statutory period.46 This qualifi-
cation is followed by only a minority of states4 7 and there is no
mention of it in the Louisiana jurisprudence.
The cases which have been discussed thus far, those apply-
ing the "substantive" exception, have been those in which the
action was not barred by the forum law, but was barred by the
lex causae. By the use of this exception, the foreign statute of.
limitations was allowed to prevail.
' However, in cases involving "substantive" prescription, when
the forum has a shorter period of limitation, the authorities in
America are about equally divided.48
Some hold that the longer prescriptive period of the foreign
state should govern, just as it would if the statute of limitations
of the lex causae were shorter than that of the forum-since
foreign substantive law is always the "law of the case." Others
hold that the forum should set the "upper limit" of the action
and should not be forced to give to foreigners rights denied to
its own citizens, as this would violate "public policy."
The idea that the forum should set the upper limit seems
appropriate, in view of the fact that the general rule that statutes
of limitation are procedural was developed to prevent the en-
forcement of longer foreign periods. The "substantive" exception
46. Story, Conflict of Laws (8 ed. 1883) § 582.
47. Ailes, supra note 2, at 497.
48. Ibid.
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was developed solely to allow the enforcement of shorter foreign
periods and not intended to allow suits barred by the forum law.
Even some of those writers who believe that in all cases if
the action has prescribed under the lex causae it should not be
allowed in the forum believe that in the converse situation the
shorter period of the forum should govern. Pillet,49 Weiss,50 and
Lorenzen"' hold the view that the forum should not be expected
to enforce claims barred by its laws.
In those Louisiana cases where the action was barred under
Louisiana law, but not under the lex causae, the bar of Louisiana
was applied with no discussion of whether the foreign law was
substantive or procedural. In Succession of Lucas52 a judgment
not barred by the French law of Guadaloupe, where it was ren-
dered, was barred from suit in Louisiana by the ten year prescrip-
tion of personal actions.
There was a suit on a Texas judgment in White v. Davis.53
Both Louisiana and Texas had the same prescriptive period of
ten years. The period had run, but the judgment had been
revived ex parte, which interrupted prescription in Texas. But
since the Louisiana law of prescription applied and Article 3547
of the Civil Code provides that judgments must be revived con-
tradictorily to interrupt prescription, the suit was barred.
However, since the 1949 United States Supreme Court case
of Union National Bank of Wichita v. Lamb,54 the action of the
Louisiana court in the Davis case might be held to constitute a
denial of "full faith and credit"; but this is merely an application
of the "full faith and credit" clause and not an application of
general conflict of laws rules.
In the Lamb case, a Colorado judgment was obtained in 1927
and revived there in 1945. The plaintiff sued in Missouri on the
revived Colorado judgment. Under the Missouri statute of limi-
tations the life of a judgment was limited to ten years from its
rendition or revival. Missouri law also provided that there could
be no revival of a judgment after ten years from its rendition.
The Missouri Supreme Court held that, under the rule that the
lex fori governs limitations of actions, the Missouri statute of
49. 2 Pillet, Trait6 Pratique (1923) 299.
50. 2 Weiss, Trait6 theoretique et pratique de droit international priv6
(2 ed. 1912) 406.
51. Lorenzen, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws (1918)
28 Yale L.J. 492, 497.
52. 11 La. Ann. 296 (1856).
53. 174 La. 390, 141 So. 6 (1932).
54. 69 S.Ct. 911 (U.S. 1949).
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limitations of ten years had run on the original judgment and by
Missouri law there could be no. revival. On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, it was decided that there had been
a denial of "full faith and credit" to the Colorado revived judg-
ment by the Missouri court. The United States Supreme Court
differentiated cases in which the forum might apply its own
period of limitation to a foreign judgment and a case, such as
the present one, in which construing the original judgment as not
revived (because of the law of the forum) denies to the revived
judgment recognition as a judgment, and hence violating the "full
faith and credit" clause.
In reversing the judgment of the Missouri court, the United
States Supreme Court did not discuss the contention, also not
passed on by the Missouri Supreme Court, that the revival was.
by the law of Colorado, not a new judgment, but only an ex-
tension of the period of limitation of the old judgment. Justice
Frankfurter, in his dissent, said that it was not clear that the
Colorado reviver created a new judgment and that the case
should be remanded to the state court for determination of this
question.
Tolling Statutes
Notwithstanding the general rule that the limitation of the
forum applies, many states have enacted "tolling statutes" which
prevent the statute of limitations from running in favor of an
absent debtor.
A small minority of these states limit "the suspensory effects
of tolling statutes to instances where the cause of action arose
within the state, where the plaintiff became a resident before the
bar of the forum was complete or where the defendant was -a
resident- at the time such action arose." 55 But usually these
statutes suspend the period of limitation even if the cause of
action arose out of state and between non-residents.
These statutes created the possibility that an action might
be barred by the" law. of the state where the "cause of action"
arose, but that that bar could not be used because the prescrip-
tion WWs procedural and the forum would apply its own pre-
scriptive period, but that such time limit of the lex fori could
not be used because the defendant was an absentee. This condi-'
tion may still exist under such a "tolling statute" unless it has
been modified by the so-called "borrowing statute."
55. Comment (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 762, 763.
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Borrowing Statutes
Most of the states have enacted "borrowing statutes" with
regard to the statutes of limitation of foreign states. The general
idea of the "borrowing statute" is that an action barred "else-
where" will not be enforceable at the forum, even though it
would not be barred by the ordinary limitation of the forum.
Where is "elsewhere"? Most of these statutes use the limitation
of the state "where the cause of action arose" and hold that, in
the case of a contract, this is the place of performance, and in
the case of a tort, it is where the injury occurred.56
But there are still problems. Some cases have held that
when the defendant is suable only at his residence, the cause of
action arises there. Some states adopt the bar of the residence
of the defendant. "Residence" is usually construed to mean the
residence at the time the cause of action arose. But a few cases
have construed it as meaning any later residence in a state in
which the action became barred. Under the decisions interpret-
ing some statutes, the defendant must still be living in the state
of "residence" when the bar becomes complete.
7
In Illinois, a cause of action is said to have arisen in any
state where the defendant can be sued and the action is
held to be barred if the statute of any one of these states has
run.5s
In Louisiana, the "borrowing statute" is embraced in Article
3532 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870 and first came into our
law by Act 168 of 1855.59 That article provides "Whenever any
contract or obligation has been entered into, or judgment ren-
dered, between persons who reside out of the State of Louisiana,
and to be paid or performed out of this State, and such contract,
obligation or judgment is barred by prescription or the statute
of 7limitations of the place where the contract or obligation is to
be performed or judgment executed, the same shall be considered
and held as barred by prescription in Louisiana, upon the debtor
who is thus' discharged subsequently coming into this State."
Article 3547 of the Revised Civil Code, which relates to the
prescription of judgments, provided as follows: "All judgments-
for money, whether rendered within or without the state, shall be
prescribed by the lapse of ten years from the rendition of such
56. Id. at 764, 765.
57. 75 A.L.R. 203, 204 (1931).
58. 75 A.L.R. 213 (1931).
59. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 2808 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2047]..
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judgments," to which was added by Act 278 of 1936, "except that
no judgment for money rendered without the state if it is pre-
scribed or unenforceable under the laws of the state where it
was rendered."6
For a judgment, contract, or other obligation of another state,
barred there, but not barred in Louisiana, to fall under Civil
Code Article 3532, these conditions must be present:
1. The judgment or contract must have been made or ren-
dered out of state between parties residing out of state, and
2. The foreign statute must have run before the debtor came
to Louisiana.6 1
In Newman v. Eldridge62 a judgment had been barred in
Mississippi. Our court used the Louisiana prescription and
allowed the action because the borrowing provision of Civil Code
Article 3532 did not apply in that the judgment debtor came to
Louisiana before the Mississippi bar was complete.
In the suit of Roper v. Monroe Grocery Company,3 which
was certified to the supreme court, the suit had been brought on
a Colorado judgment and the debtor, residing in Colorado, did
not come to Louisiana until the bar of the Colorado statute was
complete. It was held that Article 3532 was applicable although
the plaintiff had been a resident of Louisiana.
In Manderville v. Hunton64 and Young and Geraghty v.
Bowie6 5 the Louisiana "borrowing statute" was applied to bar a
judgment barred by a Mississippi statute.
An interesting case is Morton and Hammer v. Valentine,6
decided in 1860. This was a suit in Louisiana on a Mississippi
judgment. A Mississippi statute, providing that no judgment
could be revived by scire facias or action brought on it after
seven years from the rendition, was pleaded as applicable under
the Louisiana "borrowing statute." But a Mississippi court had
allowed the judgment to be revived after the seven years. The
court said that to be barred in Louisiana under the "borrowing
statute" a judgment must be completely barred where rendered
and since the Mississippi court had allowed the revival, :obvi-
ously the judgment was not barred where rendered. Hence the
60. Art. 3547, La. Civil Code of 1870.
61. Walworth v. Routh, 14 La. Ann. 205 (1859).
62. 107 La. 315, 31 So. 688 (1902).
63. 171 La. 181, 129 So. 811, 14 La. App. 270, 129 So. 815 (1930).
64. 15 La. Ann. 281 (1860).
65. 3 La. App. 8 (1925).
66. 15 La. Ann. 150 (1860).
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Louisiana law of prescription was applied, under which the
Mississippi scire facias was a suit interrupting prescription, and
the suit was allowed.
Park v. Markley,"7 a Louisiana court of appeal case, empha-
sized that neither Civil Code Article 3532 nor the amendment
to Article 3547 changes the rule that a judgment barred in
Louisiana (although not barred under the law of the state of
rendition) will not be enforced in Louisiana, but this conclusion
might be limited by the effect of the Lamb case.
So, although Louisiana under its "borrowing statute" will
enforce a shorter prescriptive period, its courts will not enforce a
longer one. However, in an appropriate case involving "substan-
'tive" prescription, our court might follow those courts which
have adopted longer periods of limitation under like circum-
stances.
It is apparent that although Article 3532 provides for the
use of the foreign statute of limitations as to both foreign con-
tracts and foreign judgments only if the bar has completely
accrued before the debtor comes to Louisiana, the amendment to
Article 3547, which refers only to foreign judgments barred out
of state, interposes no such condition.
It seems, therefore, since the amendment to Article 3547 by
Act 278 of 1936, that a judgment debtor might plead a foreign
statute of limitations that had started running while he was a
non-resident of Louisiana, but had only accrued since he had
established residence in Louisiana.
Since the matter of enforcing foreign statutes of limitation
has now been relegated largely to the field of so-called "borrow-
ing statutes," there is no just reason why the entire field should
not be covered by such statutes as to all claims, including those
expressed in judgments.
There is also no just reason why a state should enforce obli-
gations created and barred by prescription in a foreign state.
Although pleas of prescription may not be good morally and
may not be favored by the law, it is probable that this fact is
outweighed by the advantage to the public of having its courts
kept clear of stale claims. It is suggested that this would be a
good field for uniform legislation.
MARY BIRD PERKINS
67. 17 So.(2d) 459 (La. App. 1944).
1950]
